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How Far Should Increased Risk
Recovery Be Carried in the Context of
Exposure to Hazardous Substances?
INTRODUCTION
Much debate has been directed toward the topic of public
protection from latent effects of exposure to toxic substances.'
Uncertainty as to medical causation makes it difficult to dem-
onstrate that an existing disease or an existing condition was
caused by a given tortious exposure. 2 The barriers to recovery
are even more pronounced when the plaintiff seeks recovery for
a condition or a disease that is not yet present, but is anticipated
to result from the tortious exposure.3 Not only must plaintiffs
prove the existence of a causal connection between the exposure
and the future condition, but in most jurisdictions, they must
also prove that the future condition is reasonably certain or
reasonably probable to develop at some point in the future.4
Since the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, lack of medical
evidence generally indicates the plaintiff will be unsuccessful in
recovering for anticipated future consequences of past exposure
to toxic substances. 5
See Brachtenbach, Future Damages in Personal Injury Actions-The Standard
of Proof, 3 GoNz. L. REv. 75 (1968); Elliott, Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis
of Toxic Compensation Systems, 73 GEO. L.J. 1357 (1985); Comment, Personal Injury
Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal for Tort Reform, 10 B.C. ENv. AFF. L. REv.
797 (1982-83) [hereinafter Comment, Personal Injury Hazardous* Waste Litigation];
Comment, Increased Risk of Disease from Hazardous Waste: A Proposal for Judicial
Relief, 60 WAsH. L. Ray. 635 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Increased Risk of Disease].
Substances that result in such latent injuries include asbestos, radiation, coal dust, cotton
dust, chemical compounds such as benzene, and drugs such as diethylstilbesterol (DES).
See Note, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury Claims: An
Exception or the Law?, 43 U. PrrT. L. Rav. 501, 502 (1982).
2 See Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demon-
strating Cause-In-Fact, 7 HARv. ENvTL. L. Rnv. 429, 430 (1983).
3 See Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note I at 636, 638.
4 See infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
I Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FoanarA
L. REv. 732, 741 (1984).
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Difficulties such as these make case-by-case litigation a highly
inefficient method for compensating victims and for deterring
negligent acts of defendants. 6 At least one commentator has
concluded that traditional tort law principles are fundamentally
inappropriate to cope with the modem reality of toxic tort
problems. 7 Under this view, the public would be protected pri-
marily by criminal prosecution of offenders8 and by administra-
tive agency regulation.9 Individual causes of action would be
available, if at all, only for diseases and conditions that have
become manifest at the time of the claim. 10
Other commentators have taken a less radical approach to
the problem. They suggest that common law tort principles
should be adapted to the special circumstances of victims of
latent injuries caused by exposure to hazardous substances."
These writers cite the inadequacy of statutory and administrative
relief for such victims, 12 and suggest that the traditional ap-
proach to damage recovery for future injuries13 should be mod-
ified to allow recovery for the increased risk of future diseases
and future conditions that develop from a present disease or a
present condition caused by the tortious exposure. Several states
have already adopted this approach. 14 Further departing from
the common law rule, these commentators argue that victims of
exposure to toxic substances should be allowed recovery for the
increased risk of future conditions and future diseases even if
no present injury exists. 5
This Comment will address both substantive and policy issues
that shape the circumstances under which recovery for increased
6 See Elliott, supra note 1, at 1374.
7 Id. at 1358.
3 Id. at 1359.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 1360.
See Shaw, Cihon- & Myers, The Discovery Rule: Fairness in Toxic Tort Statutes
of Limitations, 33 CLav. ST. L. Ray. 491, 492-94 (1984-85); Comment, Personal Injury
Hazardous Waste Litigation, supra note 1, at 842-44; Comment, Increased Risk of
Disease, supra note 1, at 635-37.
12 Id.
13 See infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
"4 See infra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
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risk of a future disease or a future condition is desirable, with
emphasis on improving the victim compensation system. First,
prevailing common law requirements of recovery for future con-
ditions under the "all or nothing" approach will be described. 16
Next, the problems of recovery under the all or nothing approach
will be addressed, 17 followed by an analysis of the "extent of
the injury rule," a form of increased risk recovery."' Finally,
arguments will be weighed in support of and in opposition to
the extension of ificreased risk recovery to the situation in which
neither present nor future injury can be proven to a reasonable
certainty or a reasonable probability. 9
I. THE TRADITIONAL RULE-ALL OR NOTHING APPROACH
Traditionally, courts have refused to allow recovery for in-
creased ri~k of a future condition based on the tort law principle
that the plaintiff must establish an injury that is not specula-
tive.20 The prevailing approach allows present damage recovery
for the future disease or the future condition, but only if it can
be proven, beyond the standard of speculation adopted by the
given court, that the disease or the condition will occur in the
future. 21 This has been labeled the "all or nothing" approach
because the plaintiff either receives full compensation for the
future condition,2 or is barred from recovery until the condition
becomes manifest.Y To show that future injury is not specula-
tive, courts generally require that future injury must be proven
"6 See infra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 39-79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 80-106 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 107-29 and accompanying text.
See Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp, 14, 17 (D. Colo. 1984)
(applying South Dakota law).
21 See Annotation, Future Disease or Condition, or Anxiety Relating Thereto, as
Element of Recovery, 50 A.L.R. 4th 13, 29 (1986).
" Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (the
alleged future effect may be treated as certain to happen, with full compensation granted
for it). But see Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 641 (W. Va. 1974) (Neely, J., concurring)
(supporting a simple probability or pro rata approach).
21 See Annotation, supra note 21, at 30.
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
by a standard of either reasonable certainty or reasonable prob-
ability.2
Presently, sixteen states have applied the reasonable certainty
rule,25 under which courts allow recovery for the future condition
if there is reasonable freedom from doubt as to the condition's
future occurrence.26 While absolute certainty is not required, 27
the reasonable certainty rule is a stricter standard of proof than
the reasonable probability rule.2 The reasonable probability rule
has been described alternately as requiring only a reasonable
belief "as to the existence or nonexistence of one fact from the
existence or nonexistence of some other fact," 29 a greater than
fifty percent chance, 30 or a "more likely than not" standard of
proof.31 Presently, eleven jurisdictions have applied the reason-
24 See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text. But see Rogers v. Sullivan, 410
S.W.2d 624 (Ky. 1966) (future conditions are treated as part of permanent injury
damages); Spurlock v. Spurlock, 349 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Ky. 1961) (after permanence of
injury is determined, jury may dispassionately compensate in such measure as to be fair
and reasonable).
See, e.g., Bailey v. Bradford, 423 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Ark. 1968); Kahn v.
Southern Pac. Co., 282 P.2d 78, 82 (Cal. App. 3d 1955); Bauman v. City & County of
San Francisco, 108 P.2d 989, 1000 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940); Cordiner v. Los Angeles
Traction Co., 91 P. 436 (Cal. App. 2d 1907); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d
1369, 1376 (IMl. App. 1979); Harp v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 370 N.E.2d 826, 829 (Ill.
App. 1977); Lauth v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 91 N.E. 431, 434 (Ill. 1910); Elzig
v. Bales, 112 N.W. 540, 543 (Iowa 1907); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.j 399
N.W.2d 1, 8 (Mich. 1986); Prince v. Lott, 120 N.W.2d 780, 781 (Mich. 1963); Carpenter
v. Nelson, 101 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. 1960); Odegard v. Connolly, I N.W.2d 137,
140 (Minn. 1941); Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 866 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2903 (1986); Hahn v. McDowell, 349 S.W.2d 479, 482
(Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Rael v. F. & S. Co., 612 P.2d 1318, 1321 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979);
Briggs v. New York Cent. & H.R.R., 69 N.E. 223, 225 (N.Y. 1903); Leonard v. North
Dakota Coop. Wool Mktg. Ass'n, 6 N.W.2d 576, 582 (N.D. 1942); Larson v. Russell,
176 N.W. 998, 1002 (N.D. 1919); Paduchik v. Mikoff, 112 N.E.2d 69, 76 (Ohio Ct. of
C. P. 1951); Pennsylvania Co. v. Files, 62 N.E. 1047 (Ohio 1901); Barron v. Duke, 250
P. 628, 632 (Or. 1926); Labree v. Major, 306 A.2d 808, 820 (R.I. 1973); Peters v.
Hoisington, 37 N.W.2d 410, 416 (S.D. 1949); Jordan, 210 S.E.2d at 634; Diemel v.
Weirich, 58 N.W.2d 651, 652 (Wis. 1953).
16 Johnson v. Connecticut Co., 83 A. 530, 531 (Conn. 1912).
2, Larson, 176 N.W. at 1002; Peters, 37 N.W.2d at 416.
1, Strictly defined, the two standards bear no resemblance to one another. Rea-
sonable certainty closely approximates the standard of proof required in a criminal
action, whereas reasonable probability requires only a preponderance of the evidence,
the ordinary standard of proof in a civil action. Johnson, 83 A. at 531.
29 Id.
- Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985).
1, Emerson v. Twin States Gas & Elec. Co., 174 A. 779, 782 (N.H. 1934).
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able probability rule to future consequences,3 2 while at least five
other jurisdictions either have used the term "reasonable cer-
tainty" when applying the reasonable probability rule, or have
equated the two terms when applying the reasonable probability
rule.
33
The underlying principle behind each standard is the same:
justice cannot be administered efficiently on a speculative basis. 34
Jurisdictions adopting the reasonable certainty rule do so because
they deem the reasonable probability rule an inadequate protec-
tion against conjectural damage awards.35 Those jurisdictions
adopting the reasonable probability rule argue there is no com-
pelling reason to impose a burden of proof that is harsher than
the ordinary requirement in a civil action. 36 In addition, courts
have argued that the reasonable probability rule is better calcu-
12 See, e.g., Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137 (interpreting Texas law); Anderson v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1230 (D. Mass. 1986); Bonds v. Busier, 449 So. 2d
244, 247 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Baldwin v. Robertson, 172 A. 859, 861 (Conn. 1934);
Johnson, 83 A. at 531; Fort Wayne Transit v. Shomo, 143 N.E.2d 431, 436 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1957); Lake Lighting Co. v. Lewis, 64 N.E. 35, 37 (Ind. App. 1902); Entex, Inc.
v. Rasberry, 355 So. 2d 1102, 1104 (Miss. 1978); Carlile v. Bentley, 116 N.W. 772, 775
(Neb. 1908); Emerson, 174 A. at 782; Coil v. Sherry, 148 A.2d 481, 486 (N.J. 1959);
Budden v. Golstein, 128 A.2d 730, 734 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957), overruled on
other grounds, Botta v. Brunner, 138 A.2d 713, 725 (N.J. 1958); Martin v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1094 n.5 (Pa. 1985); Fisher v. Coastal Transp. Co., 230
S.W.2d 522, 525 (rex. 1950); Lenz v. City of Dallas, 72 S.W. 59, 62 (Tex. 1903);
Norfolk Ry. & Light Co. v. Spratley, 49 S.E. 502, 505 (Va. 1905).
" See, e.g., Wilson, 684 F.2d at 119 (defines reasonable certainty as more likely
than not); Harrington v. Alston, 267 F. Supp. 505, 506 (D.D.C. 1967); Culley v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 244 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Del. 1965) (recovery for future conse-
quences "may be had only if they will certainly or reasonably and probably result
therefrom"); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Md. 1983);
Davidson v. Miller, 344 A.2d 422, 427 (Md. 1975); Graves v. Harrington, 60 P.2d 622,
626 (Okla. 1936); Holt v. School Dist. No. 71 of King County, 173 P. 335, 337 (Wash.
1918).
, Cf. Budden, 128 A.2d at 734. The gist of the all or nothing approach is that if
recovery is allowed in cases in which the chance of the future condition's occurrence is
under 50%, the system would necessarily administer recovery to undeserving plaintiffs
over 50% of the time.
." Id. at 733. If the logic of the all or nothing approach is accepted, a reasonable
certainty standard would provide greater efficiency than a reasonable probability stan-
dard. The closer the court comes to requiring absolute certainty of the future condition,
the fewer the instances of plaintiff recovery for future conditions that do not actually
develop.
m Johnson, 83 A. at 531; Gallamnore v. Olympia, 75 P. 978, 980 (Wash. 1904).
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lated to balance the opposing interests involved.37 On the one
hand the rule seeks to allow recovery for future injuries only
when they will actually occur; on the other hand it seeks to
avoid the denial of recovery in cases in which future injuries are
not reasonably certain but actually occur. 38
II. CrTcIsMs oF TH= ALL OR NOTHING APPROACH
A. The Application of Statutes of Limitation to Latent Injuries
Historically, the most serious obstacle to recovery faced by
victims of latent injuries was the applicable statute of limita-
tion.39 At common law, the statutory period began to run at the
time of the injury, which was commonly understood to be at
the time of the breach of duty.40 In the context of toxic torts,
however, exposure to harmful substances by itself is not a legally
recognized injury. 41 Thus, an exposure victim who suffered no
17 Budden, 128 A.2d at 734; cf. Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Harriet, 15 S.W. 556, 558-
59 (Tex. 1891). While recognizing the efficiency of granting compensation only when
future consequences are very likely to be realized, the reasonable probability rule also
recognizes the unjust result when deserving plaintiffs are denied recovery because they
are unable to meet the reasonable certainty standard, even though the future condition
that eventually develops was more likely to develop than not at the time of the suit.
The argument for increased risk recovery, infra notes 80-112 and accompanying text,
extends this logic to include plaintiffs who have less than a 50% chance of actually
contracting the future disease. Excluding those at increased risk is an inefficient admin-
isiration of justice in the sense that at least some persons at increased risk will actually
develop the future condition aid will be uncompensated under either the reasonable
certainty or the reasonable probability standards.
38 Id.
1' Shaw, supra note 11, at 494.
40 PRossR & KEroN, PRossER AND KErroN ON. Tm LAW OF ToRTs § 30, at 165
(5th ed. 1984); Shaw, supra note 11, at 494.
41 Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1986) (Plain-
tiff failed to prove any injury other than exposure.); Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp.,
586 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D. Colo. 1984) (Plaintiff must prove present chromosomal damage
from exposure to radiation in order to state claim.); Laswell v. Brown, 524 F. Supp.
847, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1981), (Increased risk of cancer and cellular damage from exposure
did not constitute present injury.), aff'd, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1210 (1983); Strickland v. Johns-Manville Int'l Corp., 461 F. Supp. 215, 217 (S.D.
Tex. 1978) ("Such a suit would be readily dismissed since there has been no in-
jury .... "); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 722-23 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(Plaintiffs' allegation of exposure to DES, absent allegation of having suffered a specific
injury, failed to state a cause of action.); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399
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illness or disease during the statutory period following exposure
would be precluded from bringing an action for the future
injuries.42
The traditional function of a statute of limitation is primarily
to ensure the defendant a fair opportunity to defend an action.
The plaintiff is required to bring the action promptly so that
evidence will not be lost and facts will not be obscured by the
lapse of time.43 These functions are not served, however, when
a statute of limitation is applied in the traditional manner to
cases involving exposure to harmful substances, because loss of
evidence over time is less significant." The existence of present
disease, proximate cause, and future damages are the key issues
to be litigated. 45 Evidence for each of these issues tends to
develop over time, rather than fade.46
As the class of substances known to cause latent injury
grew, 47 not surprisingly, thirty-nine states responded by adopting
some form of the discovery rule by 1984.4 Under the discovery
rule, a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows
or reasonably should have known of the disease or injury. 49 In
some jurisdictions, the statutory period does not begin until the
plaintiff reasonably should have been aware of the causal con-
nection between the injury and the previous exposure.50 While
the use of the discovery rule increases the time in which defen-
dants are vulnerable to suit, it promotes judicial efficiency by
allowing a plaintiff to avoid litigation until the disease actually
N.W.2d 1, 5 (Mich. 1986) (quoting Strickland); Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 275
S.E.2d 900, 905 (Va. 1981) (Legally and medically, there is no injury upon inhalation
of asbestos fibers.).
4 Larson, 399 N.W.2d at 5.
41 51 Am. Jui. 2D Limitations on Actions § 17 (1970).
- Larson, 399 N.W.2d at 6 (quoting Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684
F.2d Ill, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
11 Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Larson, 399 N.W.2d at 6.
" Id.
" Note, supra note 1, at 501.
41 Shaw, supra note 11, at 494-95 n.20; see McGovern, The Status of Statutes of
Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Product Liability Actions Present and Future, 16
FoR M 416, 421-23 (1980) (a general survey of state statutes).




develops.5 1 In jurisdictions where the discovery rule has been
adopted, statutes of limitation are no longer an unjust barrier
to recovery for latent injuries. 52
B. The Modern Approach to Claim Preclusion
An additional criticism of the all or nothing approach is that
due to the broadened use of claim preclusion 53 as a method of
achieving judicial economy, a plaintiff generally will not be able
to bring one suit for present injuries and other suits for subse-
quent injuries as they become manifest. This is because the
judgment in the first action operates as an absolute bar to any
subsequent action involving the same claim or the same cause
of action.54
Traditionally, the mere fact that two actions were related to
the same occurrence or transaction was not sufficient to establish
them as the same cause of action.55 Thus, under the present
procedural systems of some jurisdictions, an action for damages
arising from present injury may be determined not to involve
the same claim as an action for damages arising from anticipated
future injury, even if the injury is caused by the same exposure
to toxic substances.5 6 Within such a system, the all or nothing
rule is not a harsh barrier to the ultimate recovery of future
damages. If a plaintiff is unable to prove that future disease is
reasonably certain or reasonably probable, the plaintiff may still
be able to seek recovery for damages arising out of the future
disease when it becomes manifest.57
11 Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1027 (Md. 1983).
,2 See Shaw, supra note 11, at 496-97.
, See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
See Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Co., 349 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1955); Gideon
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir. 1985); Carbonaro v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 526 F. Supp. 260, 262 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 819 (3d Cir.
1982).
5 46 AM. JuR. 2D Judgments § 408 (1969).
16 Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1985); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 1314, 287, 300 (N.J. 1987).
' See Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc., 481 So. 2d at 520 (If the rule against claim
splitting does not bar a second action for latent injuries, the rationale for permitting
future damages in the first action vanishes.).
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Recently, however, along with the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, most states have adopted the federal
approach to claim preclusion.5 8 This approach, also taken by the
Second Restatement of Judgments, defines a claim as "all rights
of the plaintiff ... against a defendant with respect to all or
any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions,
out of which the first action arose." 59 Under such modern pro-
cedural systems, the claim is related to the wrongful act itself,
not to the various forms of harm which result. 60 Thus, a plaintiff
must recover in a single action all damages, both present and
future, which relate to the tortious act.61
The modern procedural systems create a major obstacle to
the toxic tort plaintiff who has suffered present injury, but is
unable to prove future injuries to a reasonable certainty or a
reasonable probability. The plaintiff may choose to wait until
the possible future consequences become manifest. This would
result in a loss of recovery for present injury, unless the future
condition becomes manifest within the statute of limitations
applicable to the present injury. In the alternative, the plaintiff
may bring suit for present injury during the statutory period,
even though the plaintiff would be unable to recover damages
for the mere possibility of future disease or future condition
under the all or nothing approach. This would result in preclu-
sion of a later action should the future disease become mani-
fest. 62 In light of these potentially harsh results, a strong argument
can be made for a risk recovery rule63 which would allow a
plaintiff to bring an action for present injury during the statutory
period and to seek recovery for the increased risk of future
u See Rush v. City of Maple Heights, 147 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 814 (1958). See generally AM. JUR. DESK BOOK, Item No. 126, at 406 (1979)
(comparison of state court rules to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to Federal
Rules of Evidence).
1 RESTATEmNT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1980).
61 Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1136-37 (There is not a discrete cause of action for each
harm.).
61 Johnson v. Connecticut Co., 83 A. 530, 531 (Conn. 1912).
61 See Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137 (plaintiff seeking damages for asbestos also had
to bring action for future development of mesothelioma in the same action or claim
would be split).
6, See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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injuries that cannot be proven to a reasonable certainty or rea-
sonable probability 4
C. The Difficulties in Proving that Latent Injury Is "'Reasonably
Certain" or "'Reasonably Probable"
Yet another obstacle to recovery under the all or nothing
approach is that relatively few victims of toxic substance expo-
sure are able to prove that a future disease is reasonably probable
or reasonably certain to develop 5
Under a strict application of either the reasonable certainty
or the reasonable probability rule, quantitative data produced
by epidemiological studies is insufficient by itself to establish
that a given tortious act, such as exposure to radiation, will
cause a future condition, such as leukemia or cancer. 6 This is
because epidemiological data is based on the correlation between
two variables in a control group and a test group,67 but does
not provide information on the causal connection between a
single person's exposure to a hazardous substance and the sub-
sequent development of a disease.68 Further, the correlation es-
tablished by quantitative data is unlikely to indicate that victims
of exposure as a class have greater than a fifty percent chance
of developing the future disease.6 9 It is even less likely that over
half the cases in which the future disease is developed by mem-
bers of the test group will be attributable to the exposure.70
" See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
6 See Comment, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation, supra note 1, at
831.
, Dore, supra note 2, at 433-34; see, e.g., Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698
S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (recovery denied because proof of reasonable certainty
was based on mathematical probabilities alone), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2903 (1986).
67 Dore, supra note 2, at 432.
6, Id. at 433.
69 Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 1, at 638-39; see Wilson, 684
F.2d at 120 n.45 (chance of developing mesothelioma after exposure to asbestos is
estimated at 15%); Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 5, at 758 (the relative risk is increased
50-80% by exposure).
70 See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 5, at 758-68. Even if the chance of developing
the latent disease is over 50%, the plaintiff is still likely to have difficulty proving that
the particular tortious exposure will cause the future disease. For example, assume that
out of a given population of 2000 people, all 1000 people in the test group (all members
exposed) contracted cancer. If 600 of 1000 people in the control group (no members
[VOL. 76
1987-881 ExPosuRE To HAZARDous SUBSTANCE
The reasonable certainty or reasonable probability of a future
disease is likewise difficult to establish through oral testimony.
Generally, courts allow only expert testimony to establish the
likelihood of future disease.71 Courts often focus on whether the
expert medical witness uses the term "reasonable certainty" or
"reasonable probability" in his or her testimony, rather than
viewing the testimony as a whole to determine whether it sup-
ports a finding by the jury of reasonable certainty or reasonable
probability.72 While the distinction between "possibility" and
"probability" is significant under the all or nothing approach,
the expert witness, who is merely trying to express an opinion,
might not use the terms in such a precise fashion.7 3 Furthermore,
since the expert's opinion is usually based on the problematic
quantitative data discussed above, the expert is unlikely to be
able to form an opinion that can rise to the level of a reasonable
certainty or a reasonable probability standard. 74
exposed) also contracted cancer, the relative risk factor for a person exposed to the same
amount of toxic substances as the test group would be computed as follows:
1000/1000
1 1 1.667 Relative Risk Factor
Id. at 758. Thus, the exposure has increased the plaintiff's relative risk of cancer by
670. The percentage of future cases of cancer attributable to the exposure alone,
however, would be computed as follows:
.5% of Population exposed (1.667-1) +
.5% of Population exposed (1.667-1) + I = .40
(40% of the cancer cases developed by the test group attributable to the toxic exposure
alone.)
Id. at 761. Thus, the plaintiff would be unable to establish from this data that cancer
will more likely than not be the result of the tortious exposure, even though the plaintiff
is more likely than not to contract cancer eventually. Id. at 767-68.
71 Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137. But see Carpenter v. Nelson, 101 N.W.2d 918, 922
(Minn. 1960) (expert testimony is not the only competent testimony on which to establish
the certainty of future damages).
7See, e.g., Elzig v. Bales, 112 N.W. 540, 543 (Iowa 1907); Briggs v. New York
Cent. & H. R.R., 69 N.E. 223, 224 (N.Y. 1903). But see e.g., Thompson v. Underwood,
407 F.2d 994, 997 (6th Cir. 1969) ("Obviously, a court should not disregard the substance
of a doctor's testimony merely because he fails to use the magical words 'reasonable
medical certainty.' "); Bauman v. City and County of San Francisco, 108 P.2d 989,
1000 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940) ("The law does not require a doctor to state that future
results are 'reasonably certain' to occur before his testimony is admissible.").
" Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 5, at 743.
7' See Comment, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation, supra note 1, at
832-33; supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
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The difficulties of proof under the all or nothing rule force
the vast majority of toxic tort victims to wait until future con-
ditions become manifest before seeking recovery.75 From a prac-
tical standpoint, victims are often left with no relief for future
injury.76 At the very least, the plaintiff is forced to bring two
actions. 77 The inherent harshness of the all or nothing approach
in the context of toxic torts has led courts either to ill-reasoned
and inconsistent decisions, 78 or to allow recovery on suspect
evidence 9 in an attempt to circumvent the rule.
III. A SOLUTiON-THE EXTENT OF THE INJURY APPROACH
In response to the hardships imposed by the all or nothing
rule, several commentators have called for recovery based on
the increased risk of contracting a future condition, rather than
predicating recovery on actual development of the future con-
dition.80 The most widely accepted form of this risk recovery
approach, known as the "extent of the injury" rule, compensates
victims for the increased risk of future diseases and future con-
ditions caused by presently manifest injuries arising out of the
tortious exposure.8' Damages are granted in proportion to the
jury's reasonable estimation of the risk,82 not for the full value
of the injury that the plaintiff would have received under the all
or nothing approach. 83 In this way, plaintiffs that are unable to
prove that a future condition is reasonably certain or reasonably
probable to develop still gain some measure of compensation
71 See Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 1, at 639.
76 See supra notes 39-64 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
71 See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 5, at 741.
7,9 Id. at 735; see Mashaw, A Comment on Causation, Law Reform, and Guerrilla
Warfare, 73 GEo. L.J. 1393, 1395-96 (1985) ("[A]U these plaintiffs' victories in the
courts are based on shockingly bad science.").
11 See Comment, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation, supra note 1, at
844; Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 1 at 639.
81 See Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 1, at 639-40.
,1 See Leenders v. California Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corp., 139 P.2d 987 (Cal.
1943) (size of damage award did not indicate that jury awarded damages for infection,
but for actual impairment of eye from decreased resistance to infection).
11 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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for the possibility of future conditions while seeking recovery
for present damages within the statutory period. 4
Presently, at least seven state courts have applied the extent
of the injury approach."5 In addition, federal courts in four
other jurisdictions have construed state law to allow recovery
for increased risk when injury is present . 6 Damages for increased
risk were granted in the form of pain and suffering in two of
the aforementioned jurisdictions. 7 In four states, the increased
risk was determined as part of the jury's assessment of present
injuries."8 Only five courts have apparently recognized increased
See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Bonds v. BusIer, 449 So. 2d 244, 246 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Zel v.
Umphrey, 34 So. 2d 472, 473 (Ala. 1948); Armour & Co. v. Cartledge, 176 So. 334,
338 (Ala. 1937); Leenders, 139 P.2d at 991; Coover v. Painless Parker, Dentist, 286 P.
1048 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930); Lindsay v. Appleby, 414 N.E.2d 885, 891 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980); York v. Grant Truck W. R.R., 390 N.E.2d" 116 (IIl. App. Ct. 1979); Harp v.
Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 370 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Davis v. Graviss,
672 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Ky. 1984); Dunshee v. Douglas, 255 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn. 1977);
Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675, 680 (Or. 1973); Walsh v. Brody, 286 A.2d
666, 668 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971); Schwegel v. Goldberg, 228 A.2d 405, 409 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1967); cf. Murphy v. City of Waterloo, 123 N.W.2d 49, 55-57 (Iowa 1963) (damages
ruled not excessive, but court unclear whether they were awarded on the basis of
increased risk of epilepsy, or restricted to the abnormality proven to a reasonable
probability by electroencephalogram (E.E.G.) results).
8 See, e.g., Martin v. City of New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983) (interpreting Louisiana law); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem.
Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (apparently interpreting Tennessee law);
Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984) (apparently interpreting
South Dakota law); McCall v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1962) (appar-
ently interpreting Virginia law); see also Traylor v. United States, 418 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.
1969) (interpreting Kentucky law); Carbonaro v. Johns-Manville Corp., 526 F. Supp.
260, 263 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Someone contracting
one asbestos-related disease should know that asbestos exposure increases the risk of
other latent injuries, and that medical knowledge may entitle the plaintiffs to damages
for the increased risk."); Starling v. Ski Roundup Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507, (M.D. Pa.
1980) (Pennsylvania law allows for some measure of speculation in awarding future
damages).
0 See, e.g., Martin, 678 F.2d at 1326; Lindsay, 414 N.E.2d at 891; York, 390
N.E.2d at 121; Harp, 370 N.E.2d at 830.
u See, e.g., Bonds, 449 So. 2d at 246-47 (jury considered one percent increase in
risk of developing epilepsy to assess the value of an existing condition); Leenders, 139
P.2d at 991 (jury properly considered increased risk in determining the extent of present
injury); Coover, 286 P. at 1050 (since predisposition to future disease in.itself is some
damage, it may be considered in assessing present injury); Dunshee, 255 N.W.2d at 47
(because scarring of artery was present, plaintiff also recovered for increased risk of
stroke); Feist, 517 P.2d at 680 (". . .as a matter of common sense, a jury can properly
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risk recovery as a separate element of damages 9
Courts rejecting the extent of the injury approach have done
so on the basis that "increased risk" is too speculative to be
used as a standard for awarding damages.9 Since the odds are
against "increased risk" persons ever contracting the future
condition, allowing recovery would more often than not com-
pensate plaintiffs suffering no ultimate injury.91
Courts adopting the extent of the injury approach rationalize
that since the present injury has been proven to a reasonable
medical certainty or reasonable medical probability, and since
the present injury caused the increased risk, it is not speculative
to consider the increased risk in assessing damages.92 Absent
present injury, however, increased risk from exposure alone is
considered too speculative as a standard on which to base relief.93
Indeed, the court in Starling v. Ski Roundup Corp.94 admitted
that even when present injury exists, the award of damages for
increased risk involves a degree of speculation.95
The extent of the injury approach is more effectively sup-
ported on policy rather than substantive grounds., The primary
benefit of the extent of the injury approach is that a plaintiff
bringing an action for present damages within the statutory
period will not be forced to split the claim when unable to prove
that a future condition is reasonably certain or reasonably prob-
able. As previously stated, a victim of toxic exposure often will
be unable to meet the requirement of proof mandated by the all
make a larger award of damages in a case involving a skull fracture of such a nature
as to result in a susceptibility to meningitis than in a case involving a skull fracture of
such a nature as not to result in any such danger. ...").
, See Sterling, 647 F. Supp. at 332; Brafford, 586 F. Supp. at 17; McCall, 206
F. Supp. at 426; Davis, 672 S.W.2d at 932; Schwegel, 228 A.2d at 409.
10 See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 308 (N.J. 1987) ("TIThe
highly contingent and speculative quality of [a] ... claim based on enhanced risk ...
renders it novel and difficult to ... resolve."); Davidson v. Miller, 344 A.2d 422, 427
(Md. 1975).
91 Ayers, 525 A.2d at 308.
92Dunshee, 255 N.W.2d at 47; Feist, 517 P.2d at 680; Walsh, 286 A.2d at 668.
93 See Brafford, 586 F. Supp. at 17 (plaintiff must show present injury in form of
cellular damage to recover for increased risk of cancer).
94 493 F. Supp. 507, 510 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
93 Id. at 510-11 (Jury may use a measure of speculation in aiming at an award for
damages, especially future damages which are not always easy or certain.).
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or nothing approach. 96 The result in the majority of states is
that the plaintiff's claim for future injuries will be precluded by
an action for present injuries during the statutory period.97 If
the plaintiff could not recover for increased risk of the future
conditions, unfairness necessarily would result under such a pro-
cedural system, since past, present, and future damages must be
determined in one action. 98
A secondary argument in favor of the extent of the injury
approach is that producers of hazardous substances would be
forced to internalize a greater percentage of the costs resulting
from their tortious activities. If victims of toxic exposure are
denied recovery because they cannot meet the significant legal
standards of proof, such producers are allowed to profit from
their harmful actions. 9
Theoretically under the extent of the injury approach, victims
of toxic exposure as a class would be compensated in proportion
to the damages they sustain, 10 although each individual plaintiff
would be either overcompensated or undercompensated." °1 From
a policy standpoint, this is preferable to the situation under the
all or nothing approach, even in jurisdictions which have adopted
the reasonable probability standard.'0 The traditional approach
does allow some deserving victims to receive full compensation
for future conditions. The ultimate result, however, is a windfall
for a select few who do not develop the future condition after
See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
91See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
Schwegel, 228 A.2d at 409.
See Comment, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation, supra note 1, at
850.
" See Leenders, 139 P.2d at 991 (since the plaintiff recovers for future injuries in
proportion to the increased risk, the total amount of damages awarded over the entire
class of plaintiffs exposed will approximate the amount of damages actually suffered by
plaintiffs as a class).
0,t Cf. Comment, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation, supra note 1, at
851. The extent of the injury approach may be seen as an averaging device. Since it is
impossible to predict whether a given plaintiff will actually contract the future disease,
each is compensated in proportion to the increased risk. Those who contract the future
disease are necessarily undercompensated, but not to the degree that would exist if their
claims were split under the all or nothing approach. Similarly, those who do not contract
the future disease are necessarily overcompensated, but not to the extent of the plaintiff
who recovers full damages. Id.
"7 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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proving to a reasonable certainty or reasonable probability that
the condition would develop, and no compensation for the vast
majority of victims who are unable to prove more than a mere
increased risk. 103
A final point may be made in favor of the extent of the
injury rule. Even in jurisdictions which allow a second cause of
action for future injuries,' °4 a delay of the claim destroys the
deterrent value of the damage award. 0 5 Because of the typically
long latency periods associated with toxic exposure diseases, the
threat of liability for present tortious conduct may lie twenty to
forty years in the future. Thus, it is unlikely that businesses will
be deterred from exposing the public to more toxic waste. 1' The
extent of the injury approach is one way to make liability more
immediate for such offenders.
IV. INCREASED RISK RECOVERY WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENT
OF PRESENT INJURY
Recently, several commentators have criticized the extent of
the injury approach for not going far enough to ensure that
victims of exposure to toxic substances are adequately compen-
sated. 0 7 Specifically, they have argued that a plaintiff who has
been exposed to toxic materials, but has suffered no present
injury, should be able to recover damages for the increased risk
of future disease. 0 8
At first glance, this argument appears logically sound. If the
increased risk alone is recognized as a non-speculative element
of damages'09 there is no compelling reason to allow recovery
103 See Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 1, at 636-37 (Due to the
difficulty of proof and the requirement that all damages past, present, and future be
recovered in one action, many plaintiffs will be unable to recover future damages.).
104 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
"I Mashaw, supra note 79, at 1394.
106 Id. (The dual goals of the tort system are compensation and deterrence, but the
present value of a liability thirty years in the future is almost zero, even if the injury is
enormous.).
1o See Comment, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation, supra note 1, at
833; Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 1, at 643-44.
106 Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 1, at 643-52.
10 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol, 647 F. Supp. 303, 322 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) ("There
is simply no element of speculation in awarding those damages.").
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for increased risk when exposure is followed by present injury,
but not to allow recovery when there is no present injury.110
Under this approach, proof of exposure to toxic chemicals alone
would be sufficient to satisfy the non-speculative injury require-
ment."' Meritless claims would be eliminated by requiring proof
of proximity to the hazardous waste, as well as the duration,
intensity and frequency of exposure.12
The argument for increased risk recovery without the present
injury requirement, however, overlooks the speculative nature of
increased risk damages that traditionally has prevented courts
from allowing risk recovery in any form." 3 The present injury
requirement is based on the tort law principle that a plaintiff
must establish an injury that is not speculative." 4 Recovery for
increased risk has been allowed only in cases in which the
plaintiff has proven present injury beyond mere exposure, indi-
cating that increased risk alone is still viewed as a speculative
injury. 15
In addition, the policy arguments supporting the extent of
the injury approach are unpersuasive when arguing for risk
recovery without a present injury requirement. In states where
the discovery rule has been adopted, the plaintiff need not bring
an action for future conditions until the conditions become
manifest. 16 Since no present injuries exist, there is no reason,
beyond convenience, for the plaintiff to be allowed to bring an
action for damages before future conditions develop." 7 No un-
110 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (no requirement of present
physical injury).
Ill See Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 1, at 643-52.
112 Comment, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation, supra note 1, at 848.
'" See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
11 Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D. Colo. 1984).
£ See supra note 41.
22 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discovery rule adopted in at least
thirty-nine states).
HI Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 520 (Fla. App. 1985)(when
rule against claim splitting does not operate to bar a claim, no rationale for permitting
future damage in a present action exists); see also Devlin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
495 A.2d 495, 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) ("In denying plaintiffs' damage
claim at this time for enhanced risk this court concomitantly recognizes their right to




fairness exists when the plaintiff may recover all damages at a
later date.118 While recovery for increased risk due to exposure
alone would have greater deterrence value,119 it would not lead
to greater compensation for victims of toxic exposure as a class,
since those who later develop the future disease would still be
able to bring an action for damages.' 2°
To date, no court has applied the risk recovery rule when
no present injury existed,'21 although the Sterling v. Velsico"-2
decision could be interpreted to extend to such situations. Ster-
ling involved a class action for injuries resulting from water
supply contamination by a chemical waste burial site. Each of
five class representatives suffered numerous present and past
injuries as a result of the exposure, including headaches, dizzi-
ness, kidney infection, nausea and vomiting, skin rash, eyesight
deterioration, mouth soreness, seizures, and destruction of the
immune system. 23 In its opinion, the court specifically stated
that increased susceptibility to kidney disease, liver disease, and
cancer were present conditions for which damages could be
recovered./u The court further asserted that such damages were
recoverable under traditional principles of damage law.' "5 The
court's intention is unclear, however, since the cases cited as
allowing recovery for enhanced risk allowed such recovery only
when injury was present. For example, in Feist v. Sears, Roebuck
and Co.,' a boy was hit by a cash register and suffered a basal
skull fracture. The court did not hold that increased risk of
meningitis was an independent element of damages, .but that it
was the basis for finding some future disability arising out of
I' See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
1,9 Mashaw, supra note 79, at 1394.
'2 Cf. Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc., 481 So. 2d at 520 (The situation in which there
are no present injuries and one cause of action for future damages is analogous to the
situation in which the plaintiff has a separate cause of action for present and future
damages. It is not necessary in either case to allow the plaintiff to recover for future
damages in a present action to arrive at a just result.).
121 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
12 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
2 Id. at 325-44.
12 Id. at 321.
12 Id.
126 517 P.2d 675 (Or. 1973).
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the present injury to the boy's skull.' 27 Similarly, in Schwegel v.
Goldberg,"2 the plaintiff suffered present injury in the form of
a skull fracture and a scarring of the brain, resulting in an
increased risk of epilepsy. The court held that the jury could
weigh the evidence of the increased risk to assess present dam-
ages. 129
CONCLUSION
Despite regulatory efforts to control the growing problem of
toxic waste, litigation will continue to be the most significant
form of relief for victims of exposure to hazardous substances. 130
The traditional all or nothing approach results in substantial
barriers to recovery. Existing standards of proof for future
injuries are difficult to satisfy. Courts adopting modern proce-
dural approaches require that damages for all harm arising out
of the same transaction or series of related transactions must be
recovered in one cause of action.13'
The extent of the injury approach is justified by strong public
policy considerations. Since the plaintiff has only one cause of
action to recover all damages from a given transaction or oc-
currence, the plaintiff should not be precluded from recovering
future damages when forced to bring an action for presently
manifest injuries during the statutory period. Barriers to recovery
under the all or nothing approach often have the effect of
precluding such recovery, whereas the extent of the injury ap-
proach allows a measure of recovery that would adequately
compensate victims as a class. 32
127 Id. at 680 (Court held that testimony is sufficient as a basis of finding some
disability, since as a result of a basal skull fracture, the plaintiff was susceptible to
contracting meningitis.).
2 228 A.2d 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967).
I"' [A] scar on the brain, an abnormal condition, resulted from the accident.
There was no speculation or guessing as to that medical fact. Nor was the
neurosurgeon speculating when ... he indicated the probabilities of this
particular plaintiff suffering from epileptic seizures as a result of a con-
dition caused by this accident.
Id. at 409.
"3 See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 39-79 and accompanying text.
"1 See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
1987-88]
478 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 76
Recovery for increased risk based on exposure alone is con-
ceptually distinguishable from the extent of the injury approach
on the grounds that the injury itself is subject to a degree of
speculation."' Furthermore, strong policy arguments that under-
lie the extent of the injury approach are not present. A plaintiff
with no present injuries from exposure has no compelling need
to bring a present action. Thus, it is not unduly burdensome to
force such a plaintiff to save the cause of action until some
objective physical injury develops.3 4 Due to the lack of persua-
sive policy justification, courts should limit recovery for in-
creased risk of future conditions to situations in which some
injury from exposure is manifest.
John C. Cummings
1,3 See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
